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INTRODUCTION

Recently, I had the pleasure of hosting Professor Paul Butler as a guest
instructor to my Criminal Procedure II course, which covers constitutional
rights during criminal adjudication. This course-the "bail to jail" portion of
criminal procedure-is comprised almost entirely of students who intend to
practice criminal law. To open a discussion about Batson v. Kentucky,'
Professor Butler started with a simple case hypothetical of a young AfricanAmerican male charged with selling ecstasy at a nightclub. Professor Butler
divided the class into three groups: prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges. "Lawyers," Professor Butler asked the students, "who are your 'ideal
jurors?"'
The prosecutors wanted older jurors, seen as quicker to convict, less
likely to question authority, and more alarmed by a relatively new drug like
ecstasy. In contrast, the defense attorneys wanted younger people who might
be more discerning of police testimony and less judgmental about drugs.
"What about race?" Professor Butler asked.
It was an African-American student, playing the role of prosecutor, who
raised her hand first. Most black jurors would be less likely to convict, she
reasoned, but some older black jurors might see the defendant as a thug
who misrepresented his community.
"What do the rest of you think?" Professor Butler asked.
The students playing defense attorneys generally thought AfricanAmerican jurors would be more sympathetic to the defendant and more
scrutinizing of police witnesses. So did the students playing prosecutors. But
there was some disagreement among students about the interplay of race
with age and class. Interestingly, not a single student said race was irrelevant.
When asked, "Who is your ideal juror?" students may have debated how race
mattered, but none appeared to question that it did in fact matter. 2
In Batson, the Court prohibited the use of race-based peremptory
challenges.3 Invoking the Equal Protection Clause, the Court reasoned that
"[c]ompetence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of
individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence
presented at a trial,"4 and that "race simply 'is unrelated to [a person's]
fitness as a juror.'-5 Yet twenty-five years later, criminal procedure students,
when prompted to make transparent their unspoken feelings about race,
continue to rely on preconceived notions of race-based attitudes in
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
As Professor Butler notes in his influential book, "While virtually every criminal lawyer
agrees that race matters, there are different schools of thought about how." PAUL BUTLER, LET'S
GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (2oo9). Professor Butler also asserts that "[t]he
prosecutor who says he doesn't consider race when choosingjurors is either stupid or a liar." Id.
3. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
4. Id. at 87 (citing Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946)).
5. Id. (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
i.

2.
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describing their "ideal juror," and attorneys continue to exercise peremptory
challenges in ways that disproportionately keep people of color from serving
onjuries.
The chasm between jurisprudence and actual practice may be
explained in part by the contrast between a juror who is "competent" and
"fit," the characteristics addressed by the Court in Batson, and one who is
ideal, the concern of competitive litigators. While few today would dispute
Batson's underpinning that race does not render a juror unsuitable or
unqualified for jury service, perhaps equally few would argue that race plays
no predictive value in assessing a potential (albeit fit and competent) juror's
view of the world. Lawyers have come to see the premise of Batson as a
fiction-not because they believe a person's race makes him inherently
incapable of being impartial, but because they see peremptory challenges as
6
a way to identify and eliminate partialjurors.
Lawyers also view Batson as fiction because they have learned that the
three-part test designed to prevent race-based peremptory challenges is
"toothless."7 Under the first part of the Batson test, the party opposing a
peremptory challenge bears the initial burden of raising a prima facie case
of discrimination.' Then under the second part, to rebut the inference of
discrimination, the party exercising the peremptory must offer a raceneutral explanation for the challenged strike.9 At the final stage, the trial
court must then assess all available information and determine if the party
challenging the strike has proven that the party exercising the strike

6. Indeed, despite the Court's holding in Batson, other Supreme Court decisions appear
to implicitly acknowledge the relevance of race to jury decision making. See Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (noting in the affirmative-action context that race "is likely to affect
an individual's views"); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879) (treating the
prohibition of black citizens from juries as a violation not of the rights of the venireperson, but
of black defendants), abrogated on different grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Further, at least some Justices have discussed the relationship explicitly. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We know that like race, gender
[T] hese
matters."); id. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The two sexes differ ....
differences may produce a difference in outlook which is brought to the jury room."); Georgia

v. McCollum, 505 U.s. 42, 61

(1992)

(ThomasJ, concurring) ("[Slecuring representation of

the defendant's race on the jury may help to overcome racial bias .... "); see alsoJeffrey Bellin &
Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson 's Net To Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or
Painfully UnimaginativeAttorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, io83 (20 11) (observing that Strauder

reveals the Court's presumption that racial composition ofjuries can affect outcomes); NancyJ.
King, Postconviction Review ofJury Discrimination:Measuringthe Effects ofJurorRace on Jury Decisions,
92 MICH. L. REv. 63, 67-72 (1993) (noting the Court's inconsistent treatment of the relevance
of race to jury decisions).
7. Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure To Meet the
Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 501, 501, 527-28 (criticizing
"Batson's toothless bite").
8. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.

9.

Id. at 97.
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intentionally discriminated. ,o Even if the party opposing a peremptory
challenge makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of
rebutting that inference in stage two is extremely low. The Court has
emphasized that the race-neutral reason need not be plausible, let alone rise
to the level of a challenge for cause.- Moreover, trial courts often accept
race-neutral reasons that are easy to invoke and/or difficult to disprove,
such as demeanor evidence,12 or which correlate with race, such as having a
family member who had been a criminal defendant.'s It is no surprise, then,
that a recent empirical study by Professors Bellin and Semitsu found that the
overwhelming majority of appeals based on Batson were rejected.'4 Perhaps
even more unsurprisingly, the justice system's pattern of excluding people of
color from juries still stubbornly lingers. '5
This Article calls on prosecutors to implement voluntary reforms
seeking to minimize the government's exercise of racialized peremptory
challenges in criminal cases. I purposefully use the word "racialized" here to
distinguish a lawyer's disproportionate use of peremptory challenges by race
from the intentional discrimination emphasized by the Court in Batson and
its progeny.' 6 The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I builds the case that

1O. Id. at 98; see also Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-ElII), 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005).
11.
See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam).
12. Bellin & Semitsu, supranote 6, at 1093-95.
13. Id. at 1o96; Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2021 (1998) (observing that courts often accept "a sweeping scope of
permissible neutral explanations for prosecutorial strikes" even when they are "correlated to
some degree with race").
14. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 1092 (surveying 269 federal court decisions
reviewing Batson claims, and reporting that 85.1% of the decisions rejected the Batson claim,
while only 6.69% ordered a new trial).
15. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING
LEGACY
14
(201o),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
IllegalRacialDiscriminationJurySelection.pdf (establishing that prosecutors in the South still
systematically exclude African Americans from juries); David C. Baldus et al., The Use of
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA.J. CONsT. L.
3, 10 (2001) (analyzing capital murder trials in Philadelphia and concluding that
"discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race and gender by both
prosecutors and defense counsel is widespread"); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 1077
("[V]irtually every commentator (and numerous judges) who have studied the issue have
concluded that race-based juror strikes continue to plague American trials."); Camille A.
Nelson, Batson, OJ, and Snyder: Lessonsfrom an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1689
(2oo8) ("Batson's promise of protection against racially discriminatory jury selection has not
been realized."); Bidish Sarma, Commentary, When Will Race No Longer Matter injury Selection?,
109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 69, 71 (201 s) (decrying the failure of courts to enforce
Batson as "judicial intransigence"); Shaila Dewan, Study Finds Blacks Blocked from SouthernJuries,
N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 20o), http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o6/o2/us/o2jury.html ("[T]he
practice of excluding blacks and other minorities from Southern juries remains widespread
16. See Robin Charlow, ToleratingDeception and DiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV.
9, 38-40 (1997) (critiquing Batson's emphasis on the lawyer's state of mind). In contrast to
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prosecutors should care about the prevention of Batson violations. Part II
sets forth the institutional pressures and cognitive biases that might lead
even well-intentioned prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges in a
race-based manner. Part III concludes by calling on prosecutors to take steps
to neutralize their own exercises of peremptory challenges, including the
collection and publication of both individual and office-wide statistics
reflecting the numbers of peremptory challenges exercised and the race of
the affected venirepersons and resulting juries.
1.

WHY PROSECUTORS SHOULD CARE

A quarter of a century after the Court's decision in Batson,
overwhelming evidence demonstrates that lawyers continue to exercise
peremptory challenges in racialized ways. For example, one study of capital
murder trials in Philadelphia found that prosecutors struck 51% of black
jurors and 26% of nonblack jurors, while defense counsel struck 26% of
black jurors and 54% of nonblackjurors.'7 A recent two-year study of eight
southern states found that prosecutors routinely dismissed African-American
venire members for pretextual reasons.' 8 In one Alabama county,
prosecutors exercised peremptory challenges against 8o% of AfricanAmerican venire members.'9 In a Louisiana parish, 8o% of criminal cases
are heard by all-white juries.2o It is no wonder that scholars and judges alike
"have concluded that race-based juror strikes continue to plague American
trials."2In light of Batson's failure to alter a stubborn pattern of using
peremptory challenges in racialized ways, scholars have repeatedly called for
the abolishment of peremptory challenges.22 But, despite criticism of the

intentional racial discrimination, and as explored more fully in infra Part II.B, racialized
peremptory challenges might result from unconscious stereotypes and cognitive biases.
17. Baldusetal., supranote 15, at 52-53.
18. EQUALJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 15, at 6.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id.
21. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 1077; see Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El f1), 545 U.S.
231, 267-70 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing multiple studies showing the continuation
of race-based jury selection).
22. See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 8og, 864 (1997); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the July, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1041, 1047, 1114-36 (1995); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 503 (1996) ("It is time for the peremptory challenge to go.");
Nelson, supranote 15, at 1723; MelyndaJ. Price, PerformingDiscretion orPerformingDiscrimination:
Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in CapitalJury Selection, 15 MICH.J. RACE & L. 57, 104-07
(2009); Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits the Dangers of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2137-42 (2006). In Batson, Justice Marshall
called for the end of peremptory challenges in his concurring opinion, see Batson v. Kentucky,
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practice, every jurisdiction in the country continues to employ peremptory
strikes.23 The Supreme Court has viewed the prevalence and longevity of the
peremptory challenge in American trials as evidence of the "long and widely
held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial byjury."24
With no judicial or political movement toward the outright elimination of
the peremptory challenge,25 other scholars have called for improvements to
the current system. For example, some have proposed refinements to the
Batson three-part test,26 while others have suggested incorporating
affirmative-action principles into jury selection.27 Some have noted that
alterations to the voir dire process itself could improve the quantity and
quality of information available to lawyers about venire members and
thereby reduce the influence of racial stereotypes on jury selection.2s Many
have emphasized the role that ethical rules and disciplinary sanctions can
play in encouraging lawyers to comply with Batson's requirements.29

476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring), a position that was later embraced by justice
Breyer. See Miller-ElII, 545 U.S. at 273 (Breyer, J., concurring).
23. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at io85 (reporting that the peremptory challenge
"continues to be available in all American jurisdictions").
24.
Swain v. Alabama, 38o U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
25. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 1107 ("The legislators who possess the requisite
authority to act in such a sweeping fashion have shown no inclination to implement such a
change."); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge,
85 B.U. L. REV. 155 , 246 (2005) (noting the absence of legislative or judicial efforts to
eliminate the peremptory challenge).
26. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 1 120-25 (suggesting a reform to Batson that would
permit courts to invalidate a peremptory challenge because of the appearance of discrimination
without making a finding of intentional discrimination).
27.
See generallyJohn J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter, and CriticalMass: A Means of
Reclaiming the Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297 (2005) (arguing that Grutter v. Bollinger
should apply to jury selection so that a minority defendant may consider race as a factor to
obtain a diverse jury).
28. Jeb C. Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind Questionnaire:The Most PracticalSolution for
Endingthe Problem of Racial and Gender Discriminationin Kansas Courts While Preservingthe Necessary
Function of the Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323 (2003) (suggesting the use of
blind questionnaires to reduce the influence of stereotyping on jury selections); Jean Montoya,
The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind"
Peremptory, 29 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 981 (1996) (advocating use of blind questionnaires); Page,
supranote 25, at 254-57; Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
95 (2oo8) (recommending use of video recording during voir dire); Collin P. Wedel, Note,
Twelve Angry (and Stereotyped) Jurors: How Courts Can Use Scientific Jury Selection To End
DiscriminatoryPeremptory Challenges, 7 STAN.J. C.R. & C.L. 293 (201 1).
29.
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in jury Selection: ProfessionalMisconduct, Not
Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209 (2003); Andrew G. Gordon, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A
Proposed Ethical Rule ProhibitingRacial Discrimination in jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 685
(1993) (analyzing a proposed change to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
address Batson problems); Mattie Johnstone & Joshua M. Zachariah, Peremptory Challenges and
Racial Discrimination: The Effects of Miller-El v.Cockrell, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863 (2004)
(suggesting a modification of ethical rules as a better guarantee that lawyers will conduct
themselves appropriately during jury selection); Charles J. Ogletree, just Say No!: A Proposal To
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Doctrinal change, rules of ethics, and disciplinary sanctions would not
be necessary, however, if lawyers abated racialized jury selection through
their own voluntary conduct.3o The focus of much of the current Batson
scholarship assumes that lawyers, like the students in my class, will inevitably
consider race during jury selection and that the legacy of barring people of
color from jury service will therefore inevitably continue unless we find
external ways to detect and punish the discrimination. Stephanos Bibas has
noted, though, that external regulation of prosecutors, whether ex ante or
ex post, has proven largely to be ineffective.s' In contrast, prosecutors
themselves have the institutional ability to transform prosecutorial culture
and incentives from the inside.32 This Article speaks directly to prosecutors
and calls on them to voluntarily implement internal practices to avoid
racializedjury selection.
Although Batson applies to all litigators-criminal and civil,
plaintiff/prosecution and defense-prosecutors are often the antagonists in
the story of Batson's failure. In the prevailing Batson rhetoric, prosecutors
have every incentive to discriminate against venire members of color, and
the Court's toothless doctrine permits them to do so without penalty. In
light of racialized public opinions about crime, 3 prosecutors might be
especially tempted to use race as a proxy for a juror's predisposition.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that people of color are more likely to be
skeptical of law enforcement than white jurors.s4 They are also less likely to
Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1o99, 1117,
1122 (1994)
(recommending dismissal with prejudice and disciplinary actions against
prosecutors as a response to Batsonviolations).
30.
See Laura I Appleman, Reports of Batson's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: How the
Batson DoctrineEnforces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 607, 6o8 (2005)
(arguing that Batson is a vehicle through which the Supreme Court seeks to achieve professional
responsibility aspirations); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court
Judges, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 500 (1998) (criticizing the lack of guidance in the Supreme
Court's Batson jurisprudence and calling on ethical prosecutors and trial court judges to be
"vigilant" about avoiding bias during jury selection).
31.
Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation Versus ProsecutorialAccountability, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 978-79 (2009).
32.
See id. at 979-1015; Alafair Burke, NeutralizingCognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors,
2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 516 (2007) ("[P]rosecutors hold the key to moderate but
meaningful reform."); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009)
(noting, in the context of wrongful convictions, the importance of self-regulation by
prosecutors).
33. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in jury Deliberations, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1261,
1264 (2000) (stating that it "is often true [that] the views of jurors of color and female jurors
diverge from the mainstream").
34. See Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and White
Americans' Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156-57 (2004)
(discussing "substantial differences between Blacks and Whites" on views of law enforcement
and courts); Rod K. Brunson, "Police Don't Like Black People": African-American Young Men's
Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 71, 72, 94-96 (2007) (reporting
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convict black defendants or to impose the death penalty than white jurors.35

Moreover, because people of color are still a minority in most jurisdictions, a
prosecutor seeking to use peremptory challenges to strike venirepersons of
color is more likely to be able to do so than a defense attorney who might
seek to strike white venirepersons. Finally, the narrative goes, prosecutors
are easily able to evade Batson by offering rote, facially neutral articulations
to justify striking jurors of color. And, even in the rare case when a trial
court prohibits a prosecutor from exercising a peremptory challenge, the
prosecutor is not punished for having made the attempt. In sum, the
prevailing narrative places the interests protected by Batson (the rights of
individual defendants and potential jurors) at odds with the interests of the
prosecutor (obtaining a conviction).
However, by emphasizing a prosecutor's short-term interest in
obtaining a conviction in an individual case, this narrative overlooks the
potential convergence of prosecutors' longer-term interests and the
individual interests protected by Batson.36 For both normative and utilitarian
reasons, prosecutors should embrace the goal of diversely constituted juries.
As a normative matter, the special role of prosecutors in our adversarial
system should make them especially committed to fulfilling Batson's original
mission of colorblind jury selection.37 Unlike other lawyers whose clients

that negative interactions between police and black citizens and communities undermined
reported trust in law enforcement).
35. William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A
Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in CapitalSentencing When the Defendant Is Black and the Victim
Is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497 (2004) (examining racial differences in decision-making
processes in capital sentencing trials based on data from the Capital Jury Project); William J.
Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors'Race
andJuy Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 179, 259-60 (2001)

(finding that a

greater proportion of white jurors led to an increased likelihood of a death sentence for black
defendants, especially when the victim was white, and suggesting the "racialization" of
perceptions of violent crime); Ellen S. Cohn et al., Reducing White JurorBias: The Role of Race
Salience and Racial Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.

1953,

1954 (2009)

("[T]he

overwhelming consensus among researchers is that Black defendants are more likely to be
found guilty than White defendants, especially when the jurors are White."); Barbara O'Brien,
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Ask and What Shall Ye Receive? A Guidefor Using and
Interpreting What Jurors Tell Us, 14 U. PA.J.L. & SOc. CHANGE 201, 2 18-26 (2011) (comparing
self-reports with behavioral data to examine the influence of racial composition on jury
deliberations); see also Dolores A. Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants andJurors as Influences on Jury
Decisions, 23 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1249, 1249 (1993) (concluding that majority-white mock

juries were more likely than majority-Latino mock juries to convict a defendant, especially if the
defendant was Latino).
36. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (198o) (arguing that civil-rights reforms find ground only when
the interests of blacks converge with the interests of whites).
37. See generally Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should
Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369 (2010)

(arguing that

prosecutors should voluntarily waive peremptory challenges because a prosecutor owes
affirmative duties to the opposing party and notjust to an individual client).
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hire them to be zealous advocates, the public expects prosecutors not merely
to convict, but to further justice.
According to the Supreme Court's oft-quoted decision in Berger v. United
States, the prosecutor's responsibility
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
8
liberty to strike foul ones.3S
As "ministers of justice," prosecutors should care not only about the
outcome of a trial, but also the process used to obtain it. A conviction is
fairly obtained only if a jury has been fairly comprised. Prosecutors also
represent a diversely constituted public. As such, they are in essence lawyers
for the very communities disenfranchised by race-based peremptory
challenges.
Moreover, as a matter of utility, prosecutors should strive to avoid
racialized jury selection to advance the perception of a fair process.
Although a fair process is a noble normative goal in and of itself, social
scientists have demonstrated that procedural fairness also serves multiple
instrumental purposes. Tom Tyler's influential work has found that people
are more likely to comply with legal authority when they perceive it to be
legitimate,s9 thereby creating a more enduring form of compliance than one
that is based in fear.4o People are also more likely to cooperate with law
enforcement when they perceive law enforcement's authority as legitimate.4'
Importantly, an individual's personal experience with law enforcement
shapes his view of the legitimacy of law enforcement:
Personal experience does have political impact. The judgments of
adults about their obligation to follow legal authorities respond to
38. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see also Donnelly v. DiChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) (Douglas, J.,dissenting) ("The function of the prosecutor under the
Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His function
is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a fair
trial.").
39. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 3-4 (199o); Tracey L. Meares, Norms,
Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 400 (2000) (summarizing empirical work);
Tom R. Tyler &John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality
and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When FormulatingSubstantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 707, 716-17 (2000).
40.

TOM R. TYLER &YUENJ. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAw: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION

WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204 (2002).

41.

Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police

Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231,

267 (2oo8)

("Cooperation

increases not only when the public views the police as effective ...but also when citizens see the
police as legitimate authorities who are entitled to be obeyed.").
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their experiences with particular police officers and judges.
Because experience influences legitimacy, legal authorities cannot
take citizens' allegiance for granted. It can be eroded by
unsatisfactory experiences with police officers or judges. And
legitimacy will be eroded if the legal system consistently fails to
meet citizens' standards. On the other hand, the existing reserve of
legitimacy can be increased over time by positive personal
experiences with police officers and judges.42
Racializedjury selection contributes to the perception of illegitimacy of
the legal system in both trial defendants and the potential jurors who witness
the jury selection process.4s Defendants are less likely to perceive their trial
as fair when convicted by an all-white jury. Excused venirepersons will be less
likely to perceive the court system as legitimate when stricken from the jury
for no apparent reason. These personal experiences undermine the
perception of legitimacy of the criminal justice system, which in turn
undermines both compliance and cooperation with law enforcement.44
Accordingly, prosecutors have not only normative reasons to strive for raceneutral jury selection, but also utilitarian interests.45
II.

WHY PROSECUTORS EXERCISE RACIALIZED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

Despite the reasons prosecutors should be protectors of race-neutral
jury selection, both institutional pressures and cognitive biases might cause
them to exercise peremptory challenges in a race-based way, even when they
do not intend to discriminate on the basis of race.
A.

CULTuRAL INFLUENCES

Other scholars have previously noted that many prosecutors' offices
tend to emphasize conviction rates over other measures of success,46 such as
42.

TYLER, supra note 39, at io6.

43. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 125 (1990) ("[T] he racially
mixed verdict would be a step toward legitimizing the criminal justice system in the eyes of the
African-American community, which currently has little faith in the legal system's ability to be
fair and to dispense evenhanded justice."); Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race,
Diversity, andJury Composition: Battering and BolsteringLegitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038
(2003) ("Regardless of any direct effects on verdict[s], unrepresentative juries potentially
threaten the public's faith in the legitimacy of the legal system and its outcomes.").
44. See Ellis & Diamond, supra note 43, at 1039-41 (using research on procedural justice
to "help explain the mechanism through which the racial composition of juries can affect
perceptions of those juries and their verdicts").
45. Cf I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 837 (2oo8)
("[M]ore policing of the police, far from tying the hands of law enforcement, can actually work
to reduce crime in the general community.").
46. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea BargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2471 (2004) ("Favorable win-loss statistics boost prosecutors' egos, their esteem, their
praise by colleagues, and their prospects for promotion and career advancement."); Tracey L.
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the fairness of the process used to obtain convictions. Prosecutors who view
race as a proxy for antipathy toward police or distrust of the criminal justice
system may search for "neutral" reasons to strike people of color from the
venire, and Batson's framework does little to dissuade this practice. Because
Batson emphasized intentional discrimination, prosecutors do not think they
are doing anything wrong as long as they can articulate some other reason to
strike the venireperson in question.
The training of prosecutors regarding voir dire follows accordingly.
There is some evidence that at least some prosecutors are trained specifically
in the art of excluding people of color from juries. Perhaps the most
infamous example of such training is the videotape of experienced
prosecutor Jack McMahon in the late i 98os, instructing other prosecutors
on how to strike black jurors without running afoul of Batson: "When you do
have a black juror, you question them at length ....

Mark something down

that you can articulate later if something happens .... If you go in there any
one of you think you're going to be some noble civil libertarian.. . . You'll
lose ....

You're there to win."47 Although that video captured only one

(blatant) example of training prosecutors to evade Batson, and is nearly as
old as Batson itself, a recent two-year study ofjury selection practices in eight
southern states "found evidence that some prosecutors employed by state
and local governments actually have been trained to exclude people on the
basis of race and instructed on how to conceal their racial bias."4s Although
the report cites the infamous McMahon training video, it also cites more
recent examples from Texas and Alabama.49
Even if prosecutors are not instructed on how to strike venirepersons of
color, the typical training regarding jury selection focuses neither on Batson
nor the importance of avoiding even unconscious discrimination, but on
how to select a jury that is likely to convict. For example, the voir dire
section of a leading basic training manual, the APRI's Basic Trial Techniques
for Prosecutors,states nothing about Batson other than that lawyers cannot use
peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose.5o That single,
abbreviated admonishment is immediately followed by a reminder to the
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct with Financial

Incentives, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 851, 910 (1995) (proposing financial incentives for desirable
prosecutorial conduct); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO.J.

LEGAL ETHICS 355, 390

(2001)

("The desire to win inevitably wins out over matters of

procedural fairness ... ."); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, io8 (1991) ("Prosecutors who restrain
themselves may convict at a lower rate and thus appear less competent to their superiors.").
47. Videotape: Jury Selection with Jack McMahon (DATV Productions 1987), available at
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid-5102834972975877286.
48. EQUALJUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 15, at 4.
49. Id. at 16.
5o . AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., BASIC TRIAL TECHNIQUES FOR PROSECUTORS 9
(2005), availableat http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/basic-trial-techniques-o5.pdf.
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lawyer that the reasons "for your strike need not rise to the level of cause (or
even come close)."5' The manual describes voir dire as "a de-selection
process in which both parties eliminate the worst jurors for their cases," and
in which an important prosecutorial goal is to "identify venire persons who
are (1) biased or prejudiced against the police, you or your office, the case
or the victim; and/or (2) sympathetic or empathic toward the defendant."52
The manual then goes on to suggest the types of questions that a prosecutor
should ask during voir dire, suggesting that the prosecutor's first interest in
voir dire is to shape the jury in his favor.53 In contrast, prosecutors receive
far less training about the importance of race-neutral jury selection, the
potential causes of racialized jury selection practices, and strategies for
avoiding racial bias during the jury selection process.54
B. COGNITIVE BIASES
Perhaps one reason why prosecutors' offices do not have more intensive
training regarding Batson is the assumption that well-intentioned lawyers do
not need to worry about their jury selection practices. As other scholars have
noted, a critical flaw in Batson's underpinnings is the Court's emphasis on
intentional racism. In light of the Court's three-part test, a trial court's
finding of a Batson violation amounts to calling the prosecutor a liar and/or
a racist.55 Accordingly, well-meaning prosecutors are likely to assume that

they do not need to worry about running afoul of Batson.
However, recent scholarship on prosecutorial discretion has shifted its
focus to the ways cognitive biases that affect all human decision making,

51.

Id.

52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 1o-21.
In his concurring opinion in Miller-El II, Justice Breyer documented the embrace of

stereotypes by bar journals, jury selection guides, and other materials intended to educate
lawyers about voir dire, leading him to conclude that "the use of race- and gender-based
stereotypes in the jury selection process seems better organized and more systematized than
ever before." Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); see alsoJeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Stephen R. Greenwald, Harold Reynolds &Jonathan
Sussman, Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1369
(2009) (advocating further training about Batson for both new and experienced prosecutors).
55. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 11 13-16; Charlow, supra note 16, at 12-14, 17,
2o; Peter J. Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct and ConstitutionalRemedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713
(1999) (arguing that Batson permits lawyers to be less than honest about their true reasons for
challenging venire members); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and Recalcitrance:The Miller-El Remands,
5 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 131, 158 (2007) (noting that Batson requires trial judges "to make a
finding that someone with whom you must sit down at the next bar luncheon is a racist-and a
liar to boot"); Page, supra note 25, at 177-78 ("[T]o refuse to accept a peremptory challenge is
the equivalent of calling the attorney a liar, and maybe racist or sexist as well"); Tania Tetlow,
How Batson Spawned Shaw-Requiring the Government To Treat Citizens as Individuals When It
Cannot, 49 LOy. L. REV. 133, 165 (2003) ("In order to grant a Batson challenge against an
attorney, the judge must call him a liar, a judicial determination that raises legal ethics
considerations.").
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rather than flawed values, can distort prosecutorial decision making.56
Under this analysis, even a well-intentioned prosecutor might
unintentionally rely upon what she honestly believes are neutral reasons for
striking jurors of color, but which are in reality pretextual justifications. As
Anthony Page noted in his thorough exploration of the roots of unconscious
discrimination in jury selection, an attorney exercising a peremptory
challenge often "will neither know what the reason actually was nor even
know that she does not know."57
However well-intentioned, prosecutors-like all people, because of
unintentional cognitive biases-will face difficulties in achieving race-neutral
decision making.58 They may approach jury selection with preexisting
stereotypes about race-not the most invidious stereotypes imaginable (e.g.,
that people of color are not sufficiently attentive, intelligent, or hardworking
to serve as jurors), but about perceived correlations between race and
predisposition (e.g., people of color are less trusting of law enforcement).59
These stereotypes are remarkably impervious to change. 6- People continue
to perceive group-based correlations even in the presence of powerful,
6
disconfirming evidence. '

56. Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutorand Tunnel Vision, 49 How. L.J.
475 (2oo6); Bibas, supra note 46, at 2496-527; Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel
and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 16oo (205); Alafair S.
Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1587 (2oo6); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision
in Criminal Cases, 2oo6 WIS. L. REV. 291; Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance
to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 140-41 (2004); Barbara O'Brien, A
Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded
Rationality in ProsecutorialDecision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999 (2009); Myrna Raeder, What Does
Innocence Have To Do with Itt: A Commentary on Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH.
ST.L. REV.1315, 1327.
57.

Page, supra note 25, at 177.

58. Charles R. Lawrence III,The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) ("[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation."); see a/soJanet Bond Arterton,
UnconsciousBias and the ImpartialJury,40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 1029-33 (2oo8) (examining how
unconscious bias might affect a judge's fairness in the jury selection process); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect TrialJudges?,84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195,
1197-201 (2009) (same).
59. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of evidence that race
may in fact influence juror opinions.
6o.

Page, supra note 25, at 200-02.

61. See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS 54 (2002) ("[O]nce. a correlation is learned, the nonconscious system tends to
see it where it does not exist, thereby becoming more convinced that the correlation is true.").
See generally Craig A. Anderson, Mark R. Lepper & Lee Ross, Perseveranceof Social Theories: The
Role of Explanation in the Persistence of DiscreditedInformation, 39J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1037 (1980) (documenting belief perseverance); Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael
Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the
DebriefingParadigm,32J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 88o (1975) (same).
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Indeed, prosecutors who begin jury selection with race-based
stereotypes are likely to conduct voir dire in a way that only strengthens their
suspicions of venirepersons of color. Psychologists have demonstrated that
people suffer from confirmation bias, "the tendency to test a hypothesis by
looking for instances that confirm it rather than by searching for potentially
falsifying instances." 62 In a classic study of confirmation bias, subjects were
asked to identify the rule determining the numeric sequence of two, four,
six.63 To test their hypotheses, they were permitted to offer other triplets of
numbers. While subjects overwhelmingly hypothesized that the sequence
was comprised of multiples of two, the actual rule was simple: any three
ascending numbers. More importantly, to test their hypothesis, subjects
tended to offer triplets that were consistent with their theory-eight, ten,
twelve-rather than inconsistent-eight, nine, twelve. As a result, they failed
to falsify their (incorrect) hypothesis. 64
Preexisting beliefs affect not only how people search for information,
but also how they store and process it. Psychologists describe the
phenomenon of selective information processing as the tendency of people
to readily accept information that supports their prior beliefs, while
devaluing contradictory evidence. 65 In one classic demonstration of selective
information processing, subjects were asked to evaluate two studies of capital
punishment, one concluding that the death penalty effectively deterred
crime,

the

other

showing

no

deterrent

effect. 66

The

researchers

demonstrated that subjects who initially favored the death penalty were
more likely to evaluate the pro-deterrence study as persuasive, while death
penalty opponents reached the opposite conclusion. 67 Moreover, the
62. D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of ObserverEffects in Forensic
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, go CAUF. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002).
63. P.C. Wason, On the Failure To Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task, 12 Q.J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (1g6o).
64. Id. at 135.
65. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Argument Availability as a Mediator of Social Theory
Perseverance,3 SOC. COGNITION 235, 246-48 (1985); Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated
Skepticism: Use of Differential Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 574, 576, 579-81 (1992); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith,
A Disconfirmation Bias in the Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5- 6
(1996); Charles G. Lord et al., Consideringthe Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for SocialJudgment, 47
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1231-32, 1239-41 (1984); Arthur G. Miller et al., The
Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of Response Measure, Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral
Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 566-67 (1993);
Norbert Schwarz et al., Interactive Effects of Writing and Reading a Persuasive Essay on Attitude
Change and Selective Exposure, 16 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 13-16 (1980) (reporting
that subjects found sample letters to the editor more convincing and less biased when the
letters supported their own positions).
66. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2o98, 2100 (1979).
67. Id. at 2101-0 4 .
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subjects were wholly unaware that their evaluations were influenced by the
studies' outcomes. Instead, the subjects offered seemingly neutral reasons,
such as criticisms of the methodology employed by the study opposing their
viewpoint. As a result of selective information processing, both groups of
subjects reported a strengthening of their preexisting beliefs, even though
all of the subjects reviewed the same contradictory evidence. 68
Because of confirmation bias and selective information bias, a
prosecutor's preexisting wariness of venire members of color will be resistant
to change. In hypothesis-testing terms, a prosecutor approaching jury
selection with stereotypes will be testing her theory that a venireperson of
color is less likely to convict. The human tendency toward confirmation bias
may lead her to question the venireperson of color differently than a white
venireperson. The prosecutor might, for example, be more likely to ask
black venire members questions that would reveal negative experiences with
6
law enforcement or discomfort with the death penalty. 9
Once the venireperson answers those questions, selective information
bias might distort the prosecutor's interpretation of the venire member's
responses. Answers that appear to be consistent with preexisting stereotypes
(a negative experience with law enforcement or a relative's criminal
conviction) will be seen as confirmatory evidence. Meanwhile, the
prosecutor may interpret ambiguous information in a manner that is
consistent with the preexisting stereotype, and may ignore or undervalue
responses that are inconsistent with the stereotype.7o For example, a pause
in the venire member's answer might provoke an adverse inference about
the person's views about police or prosecutors, and a positive statement
about a police officer might be seen as less important than some other
indication of a negative predisposition.
Moreover, because of confirmation bias in recall, when it is time to
begin exercising peremptory challenges, the prosecutor might be more
likely to readily recall information suggesting that venirepersons of color are
predisposed against the prosecution.7' The fact that lawyers have to make
quick, "seat-of-the-pants"72 decisions about whether to strike a given venire
member while quickly processing information about other venire members
and the effect of a strike on overall jury composition only increases the
power of preexisting beliefs. Psychologists have demonstrated that reliance
on heuristics and stereotypes is highest when people are under time
pressure and cognitive load.73

68.
69.

Id.
Page, supra note 25, at 218.
70.
Id. at2 18-1g.
71.
Id. at 220.
72. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
73. Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 8 (2000); see also
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Scholars and commentators increasingly discuss the role that "tunnel
vision" plays in wrongful convictions,74 where police and prosecutors
develop an opinion about a defendant's guilt and then filter all information
through that lens.75 As a result of cognitive bias, prosecutors might
unconsciously use a kind of tunnel vision in jury selection, unconsciously
assigning differential value to potential jury selection criteria in race-based
ways.76 A recent study by Sommers and Norton demonstrates how lawyers
might engage in racialized jury selection without any awareness of the true
reasons underlying their decisions.77 The researchers described two
potential jurors to their subjects, giving each juror a trait that might
potentially lead to a peremptory challenge.78 Juror #i was described as a
journalist who had written about police misconduct several years earlier,
while Juror #2 was an advertising executive with very little scientific
background who was wary of statistical evidence.79 For half of the subjects,
Juror #1 was black and Juror #2 was white; for the other half, Juror #1 was

Chris Guthrie, JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & AndrewJ. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: HowJudges Decide
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2007) (discussing how the workload of judges can affect
judicial reliance on intuition and heuristics); Page, supra note 25, at 212 (discussing reliance on
heuristics in jury selection context); Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic
Deliberation, and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 271, 292 (2006)
(noting political actors' reliance on heuristics and stereotypes during crises).
74.

COMM'N

ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,

REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S

COMMISSION

ON

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 19-22 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
commission report/chaptero2.pdf (reporting that a special commission on capital
punishment in Illinois identifed tunnel vision as a contributing factor in several cases in which
defendants were released from death row); FTP HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS COMM. WORKING
GRP., REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 3, 35-41 (2005), available at

http://wwwjustice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/pmj-pej/pmj-pej.pdf
(reporting that tunnel
vision is one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions in Canada); Dianne L. Martin,
Lessons About Justicefrom the "Laboratory"of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of
Guilt and InformerEvidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, 848-5 1 , 861--64 (2002) (examining evidence
from Canada and Britain demonstrating the role that prosecutorial tunnel vision plays in
wrongful convictions).
75. Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for
Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 898-99 (2oo8) ("[P]olice and prosecutors-as human
beings-are likely, once they have identified a suspect or formed a theory of guilt, to seek
confirming evidence and not seek disconfirming evidence."); see also Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking
the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 428-29 (2009)
("Research on the causes of wrongful convictions has produced a large body of scholarship
describing the problem of 'tunnel vision,' the unconscious cognitive biases that plague both
police and prosecutors.").
76. See Page, supra note 25, at 224-25 (discussing how lawyers might unconsciously assign
differential weight to criteria according to race).
77. Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications:Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure,31 LAW
&HUM. BEHAV. 261, 265 (2007).
78. Id.
79- Id.
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white and Juror #2 was black.o Subjects were allowed to exercise.peremptory
challenges against venire members "because (a) you don't think they would
be able to be fair jurors or (b) you do not think they would be sympathetic
8
to your case." '
Overall, subjects were more likely to strike the journalist. 82 Importantly,
however, the researchers found that all of their subjects, including
practicing attorneys, were more likely to strike the black prospective juror.
The black venire member, whether described as the journalist or the
advertising executive, was challenged by 63% of subjects. 83 When the
journalist was described as black, subjects struck him from the jury 77% of
the time, but only 53% of the subjects struck the journalist from the jury
when he was described as white.84 The advertising executive was struck by
only 23% of subjects when he was described as white, but was struck by 47%
of subjects when described as black. 85 Moreover, when asked to justify the
strikes, subjects focused not on race, but the supposedly race-neutral factor
that happened to belong to the black juror. 86 In other words, subjects who
believed the journalist was black concluded that familiarity with police
misconduct was the less-favorable trait, while subjects who believed the
advertising executive was black concluded that wariness of statistical
evidence was the less-favorable trait. 8 7
III.

PROSECUTORIAL BEST PRACTICES

To minimize the risk of race-based challenges, prosecutors' offices
should implement voluntary reforms designed to bolster the prosecutor's
role in protecting race-neutral jury selection and to neutralize the biases that
might lead to racialized peremptory challenges.
A.

TRAINING IN UNCONSCIOUS AND COGNITIVEBIASES

One method of improving prosecutorial neutrality during jury selection
would be to train prosecutors about the prevalence of unconscious
stereotypes, types of cognitive biases, and the potential distorting effects of
stereotypes and biases on prosecutorial decision making, including neutral
jury selection. Some psychological research suggests that self-awareness of

8o.

Id.

81.
Id. at 266 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82.
Id. at 267. Sixty-six percent of subjects struck Juror #i, while thirty-four percent
challenged Juror #2. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85.
Id.
86. Id. at 267-68.
87. Id. at 267.
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cognitive limitations can improve the quality of individual decision
making.88
Prosecutors may not initially believe that they personally are at risk of
discriminatory jury selection practices, but training sessions might begin by
replicating one of the many studies that have shown the influence of race
upon peremptory challenges in the aggregate. For example, a prosecutor's
office might give attorneys the case hypothetical used by Sommers and
Norton. Recall that in that experiment, subjects could exercise a limited
number of peremptory challenges and were given two juror profiles, each
containing a potential basis for exercising a strike (either familiarity with
police abuse or a wariness of statistical evidence), but with different racial
identities provided (half of the subjects thought Juror #I was black, while
the other half believed Juror #2 was black).S8 As Bellin and Semitsu have
noted, evidence of racial bias was never apparent in any decision maker's
individual case.o A replication of this experiment within a prosecutor's own
office would be powerful evidence of unconscious bias. Each individual
prosecutor might believe that he or she has a race neutral-reason for striking
a juror who happens to be black, but the data in the aggregate, if replicated,
would form incontrovertible evidence of the unconscious role of race.
B.

"SwITCHING "EXERCsEs

Another method of neutralizing bias would be to encourage
prosecutors to engage in "switching" exercises during voir dire, asking
themselves to pretend that venire members are of a different race or gender.
Cynthia Lee has suggested that jurors determining reasonableness claims in
self-defense and provocation cases should be instructed to conduct switching
exercises,9' a suggestion that at least one court has implemented.92 In that
context, jurors attempt to neutralize their own biases by asking themselves
whether they would view a case differently if the race, gender, or sexual
orientation of the parties involved in the case were changed. Bennett Capers
has extended Lee's work into the realm of criminal procedure, arguing that

88.

See

RICHARD

NISBETT

&

LEE Ross,

HUMAN

INTERFERENCE:

STRATEGIES

AND

SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGEMENT 191 (i980) ("The effectiveness of a variety of
procedures for discrediting information also may depend on their capacity to make subjects
aware of some of the processes underlying the perseverance of their beliefs.").
89. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
9o . Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at 1 104.
91.
CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL
COURTROOM 224-25 (2003) (recommending race-switching jury instructions to limit the
influence of racial stereotypes in jurors); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 471, 564-66 (2oo8) (recommending gender and sexual-orientation switching to make
jurors aware of antigay bias in cases involving claims of gay panic).
92. LEE, supra note 91, at 257-58 & 343 n.103 (quotingJury Instruction No. 36, Alaska v.
Lockhart, No. 3 AN-S9 6-2 3 62).
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not only jurors, but also police officers, prosecutors, and judges should use
switching exercises to neutralize implicit gender, race, and other biases.93
Prosecutors might be especially receptive to engaging in switching
exercises given that evidence of racially disparate treatment of venire
members is one of the only forms of proof that has led to reversals of
convictions based on Batson. Bellin and Semitsu's recent empirical study
reported that, in the eighteen successful post-trial Batson challenges that
they identified, only "ten involved undeniable evidence of implausibility
based on side-by-side comparisons of similarly situated jurors of different
races."94 The Supreme Court has noted that prosecutors evidence disparate
treatment if they strike a venire member of color using reasoning that would
appear to apply to white venire members who are not struck.95
Discrimination can also be reflected in disparate questioning, where
prosecutors pursue a line of questioning only with venire members of
color.96 By engaging in switching exercises and pretending that venire
members are of different races and genders, prosecutors might be able to
determine whether they are employing either disparate questioning or
reasoning during the peremptory challenge process.
C.

STATISTICS: THE PROOFIs IN THE PUDDING

Another method of identifying and neutralizing bias during the
peremptory challenge process would be to collect and publish both
individual and office-wide data regarding the exercise of peremptory
challenges.97 Just as they collect statistics regarding conviction rates,
prosecutors' offices should track the number of peremptory challenges
93. I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal,20 YALE J.L. &HUMAN. 1, 24 (2oo8)
("Just consider what justice might look like if law enforcement officers, prosecutors, jurors, and
even judges
engaged
in switching
exercises-or
imaginative
acts
of cross
gender/race/class/status dressing-with respect to suspects, defendants, victims, witnesses."); I.
Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 75-76 (2009)
(extending Lee's work to the area of criminal procedure by encouraging police officers to
engage in switching exercises to neutralize implicit racial bias).
94. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 6, at io99 (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 48286 (2008)).
95. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (noting that the prosecutor's stated reason for striking a black
venire member based on his schedule as a student-teacher was implausible in light of the
prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors with similar time demands); Miller-El v. Dretke (MillerEll), 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) ("If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist
applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence
tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step.").
96. Miller-ElII,545 U.S. at 261.
97. Peter Joy has suggested to the press that prosecutors be required to maintain
peremptory challenge statistics. Donna Walter, Missouri Supreme CourtJudge Suggests New Limit to
Peremptory Challenges, ST. Louis DAILY REC., Mar. 2, 2002, (available on LexisNexis) (noting
Professor Joy's opposition to reducing the number of peremptory challenges and identifying
Joy's proposed reforms, including the maintenance of statistics to reveal discriminatory
patterns).
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exercised, the reasons for the challenges, the race of the affected
venirepersons, and the composition of the resulting juries.
Looking to data collection for reform has precedent in the policing
context where many jurisdictions, in response to concerns about racial
profiling, require police officers to maintain data regarding the individuals
selected for questioning, stops, and frisks.98 Release of these data revealed,
for example, that nearly ninety percent of the New York City Police
Department's stops in 2006 were of nonwhites, and that nonwhites generally
underwent more intrusive stops than did similarly situated whites.99 In
contrast, data in Cincinnati revealed no evidence to support an inference of
widespread racial profiling, but did identify ten officers who appeared to be
stopping significantly more black drivers than did other officers patrolling
under the same circumstances. ,I o
Maintaining data regarding prosecutorial exercises of peremptory
challenges would serve multiple purposes. A policy requiring prosecutors to
report their jury selection practices would raise internal awareness about the
importance of race-neutral jury selection, making clear that avoiding the
distorting influence of race and choosing representative juries is a separate
and valuable objective apart from choosing ajury that is most likely to accept
the prosecution's case. Keeping statistics regarding the race of venirepersons
struck by peremptory challenges should also deter racialized strikes in the
first place. Simply knowing that one must report jury selection decisions by
race might encourage prosecutors to second guess their own unconscious
biases-by, for example, engaging in switching exercises-and to avoid
exercising strikes in ways that would create a racialized pattern in the data.
Maintaining statistics on peremptory challenges would also help reveal
both individual and institutional patterns that may exist. Offices could ask
individual prosecutors to explain any troubling trends in their own jury
selection decisions, requiring them to undergo further training or discipline
as appropriate. Office-wide patterns might persuade supervisors that more
drastic intervention is required, such as an internal policy forbidding or

98.

See MATrHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTION POLICIES FOR STATE POLICE, 2004, at

1-3 (2005) (reporting

that twenty-nine of forty-nine state police agencies with patrol duties required officers to collect
the race or ethnicity of stopped drivers, and that twenty-two of these agencies made the
resulting data available to the public); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and
Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 364
(2001) (advocating a requirement that law-enforcement agencies "collect, maintain, and
report" data regarding the race of people who are stopped and searched).
99.
GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES iii, xiv (2007), available at http://www.
rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RANDTR53 4 .pdf.
1oo.
GREG RIDGEWAY, CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC STOPS: APPLYING RAND'S
FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE RACIAL DISPARITIES Xii-Xiii (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/monographs/oo9 /RANDMG91 4 .sum.pdf.
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limiting the exercise of peremptory challenges. l I Even more potentially
transformative would be a practice of making the collected data public.
Defense attorneys could use any data showing the disproportionate
exclusion of venire members of color to help establish prima facie Batson
violations in future litigation.oz Judges might be less likely to accept
implausible but race-neutral justifications for peremptory challenges if they
are aware of individual or office-wide disparate impact in the aggregate. The
public would be better informed about prosecutorial practices and therefore
better equipped to hold the prosecutor's office accountable at the ballot
box. 1s Full and public disclosure about prosecutorial jury selection practices
also demonstrates a prosecutor's office's commitment to transparency,
which in turn promotes the appearance of prosecutorial accountability and
institutional fairness.104
CONCLUSION

Much of the current Batson literature casts prosecutors as antagonists,
but prosecutors themselves are in the best position to redefine their role by
monitoring and modifying their own conduct. Prosecutors are not only
aware of the special function they play in the adversary system, they take
great pride in it. They see their obligation to do justice as separating them
from other lawyers who are merely zealous advocates.'°5 However, as a
1oi. Howard, supra note 37, at 406-19 (arguing that prosecutors should voluntarily waive
peremptory challenges because their marginal benefits are outweighed by their damage to the
fairness of the system).
102.
Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El 1), 537 U.S. 322, 342-47 (2003) (observing that a
historical pattern of racial discrimination at a district attorney's office was a factor in concluding
that prosecutors had violated Batson); see also Joseph L. Gastwirth, Case Comment, Statistical
Tests for the Analysis of Data on Peremptory Challenges: Clarifying the Standard of Proof Needed To
Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discriminationin Johnson v. California, 4 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK
179 (2005) (arguing that formal statistical analysis could aid courts weighing Batson claims);
Amanda S. Hitchcock, "Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief': The Impact of Miller-El v.
Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1328, 1345 (2o06)
(noting that statistics can be "probative of an inference of discrimination, which is all the
defendant need show at the prima facie stage of the Batson process"); Jennifer A. Larrabee,
"DWB (DrivingWhile Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an UnconstitutionalPolice Practice,
6 J.L. & POL'Y 291, 311 (1997) (noting that although statistics will not determinatively prove
discrimination during jury selection, they will often "be the only way to prove 'the concealed
nature of most discriminatory acts"').
103.
Bibas, supra note 31, at 989-91 (discussing the importance of information to the
public's ability to monitor prosecutors).
104.
For a general discussion of the importance of transparency to prosecutorial
accountability, see ANGELA J. DAvIs, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR (2007); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participationin Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006); Medwed, supranote 56, at 177-78.
105. See Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, NegotiatingJustice: ProsecutorialPerspectives
on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, so8o (2006)
(reporting that colleagues at the U.S. Attorney's Office "view being a prosecutor as more of a
calling than a job" and as "part of their personal identity"); Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion,
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culture, prosecutors have not yet incorporated this defining aspect of a
prosecutor's professional identity into the jury selection process. As
Professor Butler has noted, it is only a "myth" that lawyers want an "impartial
jury," and, in this respect, prosecutors behave like every other lawyer who
"wants ajury that is predisposed to decide the case in favor of his client."o

6

This Article, in contrast, has built the argument that prosecutors, unlike
other lawyers, should strive for race-neutral jury selection for both ethical
and utilitarian reasons.,0 7 In light of prosecutors' special role in the legal
system, their goal, including during voir dire, should be to create fair trials
and enhance the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
In some respects, this conception of a prosecutor's job during jury
selection reflects a larger assumption about the general role of a prosecutor.
It mirrors an assumption that it is not up to the prosecutor to personally
assess the defendant's guilt and then select the jury that is most likely to
agree with that personal conclusion. Rather, the prosecutor should select a
jury that is reflective of the broader community and then permit that jury to
reach the ultimate decision about the defendant's guilt.' °8 Skeptical
prosecutors may worry that diversely constituted juries are more likely to
acquit defendants than all-white juries. Even if that is the case, prosecutors
should be willing to accept these trial losses at the cost of fairness. Moreover,
a prosecutorial willingness to lose cases before fairly constituted juries might
ultimately change the very attitudes that prosecutors seek to avoid when they
strike people of color.

Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91

MARQ. L. REV. 183,

186-87 (2007)

"prosecutorial passion").
1o6. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 12.
107. See supra Part III.
io8. SeeAlafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialAgnosticisr, 8 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 79
that prosecutors should remain agnostic about a defendant's guilt).

(discussing

(2010) (arguing

